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C00002 00002	Professor Julius Moravcsik
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Professor Julius Moravcsik

Dear Julius:

	Enclosed are two papers.  The second supersedes the first
except for motivational remarks and the examples.

	Your complaint about Hintikka's sentence 4 was seemed to
me to be the same as mine.  The logical sentence asserted that a dog
would bark at anyone who wasn't its master, and you wanted
that dogs bark in general at anyone who isn't its master but
to leave open the possibility of another reason a dog mightn't
bark.

	The point I made, and to which Hintikka agreed, was that
there may be many reasons why a dog won't bark.  We don't even
know all of them.  However, if the facts we are taking into account
offer no other explanation for a dog not barking at someone, we will
conclude that it is because the someone is its master.  My example
offered such an alternate reason by adding facts that do not
contradict those already presented.

	Combining the formalism of my 1984 paper with that 
of Hintikka's handout,
we have
%
$$∀x y. dog(x) ∧ stable(x) ∧ stable(y) ¬abnormal(aspect7(x,y)) ⊃ barks(x,y).$$
%
If we circumscribe the predicate $abnormal$ taking into account the
facts of Hintikka's handout, then we reach Holmes's conclusion.
This corresponds to the practice of supposing that matters are as
normal as the facts taken into account allow.

	However, common sense supplies an additional fact not considered
by Holmes, namely
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$$∀x y.drugged(x) ⊃ ¬barks(x,y)$.
%
In itself this does nothing to alter Holmes's conclusion, even if we
add the additional fact that undrugged dogs show up for breakfast.

However, if we now add the fact that the dogs didn't show up for
breakfast, we no longer get Holmes's conclusions.